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This dissertation studies the determinants of sovereign debt rating in the OECD from the 
two main rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, between 1995-2019. The econometric model 
applied was the linear and ordered models to explain the explanatory variables. The results 
show that GDP per capita, Investment, General Public Debt, Unemployment, Government 
Revenue, and Governance may have a steady impact on sovereign ratings. 
 
JEL: C23; C25; E44; F44; G24; H63 
Keywords: Sovereign debt ratings; ratings agencies; linear models; ordered models 
  






CPI – Consumer Price Index 
EU – European Union 
FDI -  Foreign Direct Investments 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GFCF – Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OLS – Ordinary Least Squared 
S&P – Standard & Poor´s 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 4 
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 8 
2. RATING SYSTEMS AND LITERATURE ................................................................. 10 
2.1. REVIEW RATING SYSTEM .............................................................................. 10 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 10 
3. METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................... 14 
3.1. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES .......................................................................... 14 
3.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 16 
3.2.1 LINEAR REGRESSION ................................................................................ 16 
3.2.1 ORDERED REGRESSION ............................................................................ 16 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 18 
4.1 DATA ................................................................................................................... 18 
4.2 LINEAL PANELS RESULTS ............................................................................... 20 
4.2.1 RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 20 
4.2.2 PREDICTION ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 21 
4.3 ORDERED RESULTS .......................................................................................... 23 
4.3.1 RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 23 
4.3.2 PREDICTION ................................................................................................ 24 
5. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 26 









LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1– S&P and Moody's rating systems and linear transformations. ........................... 29 
Table 2 - Summary of the explanatory variables .............................................................. 30 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics. ....................................................................................... 31 
Table 4 – Correlation Matrix of Variables. ...................................................................... 32 
Table 5 - Correlation Matrix of Excluded variables. ........................................................ 33 
Table 6 - Linear Estimation for S&P. .............................................................................. 34 
Table 7 - Linear Estimation for Moody’s......................................................................... 35 
Table 8 - Linear summary of prediction error. ................................................................. 36 
Table 9– Linear movement prediction. ............................................................................ 36 
Table 10 - Ordered Estimation for S&P. .......................................................................... 37 
Table 11 - Ordered Estimation for Moody’s. ................................................................... 39 
Table 12 - Ordered summary of prediction error.............................................................. 40 
Table 13 - Ordered movement prediction. ....................................................................... 41 
 






Sovereign credit ratings are the assessments or relative likelihood of the issuer’s home 
country that a borrower will default in its obligation (Cantor, Packer, 1996). Credit ratings 
are essential to determine a country’s financial ability to meet its commitment. According to 
Afonso et al. (2011), sovereign credit ratings are important in three ways: (1) they serve as 
a critical determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the international financial 
markets and therefore of its borrowing costs, (2) they have a constraining impact on the 
ratings assigned to domestic banks or companies and (3) some institutional investors have 
lower bounds for the risk they can assume in their investments so they can choose their bond 
portfolio composition taking into account the credit risk perceived via the rating notations. 
Besides what has been said above, Sovereign ratings not only affect bond yields. According 
to Chen et al. (2016), it affects the growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product 
responds substantially to changes in sovereign rating revisions via the interest rate and 
capital flows channels.  
According to Cai et al.(2018), sovereign credit ratings of donor and recipient are essential 
drivers of bilateral FDI flows. Mostly, FDI flows from low-rated donor countries to high-
rated recipient countries.  
The influence that rating agency has, we should always expect the most straightforward 
rating quality and transparent methodology. Eijffinger (2012) concluded that rating agencies 
are lagging markets in their judgment. Their business model is inconsistent as they face 
significant conflicts of interest and are very opaque in their methodologies. The lack of 
competition renders the large three rating agencies (Moody; Fitch; S&P) with too strong 
market position.  
Therefore, to understand the determinants of credit rating assignments, where we can 
demand our policymakers what to do differently, it is necessary to know which affects 
sovereign credit ratings. This dissertation aims to test the determinants of foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings in the 37 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries. In this analysis, I researched sovereign debt ratings using rating data from 
the two main international rating agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). I have 
compiled a comprehensive data set on sovereign debt ratings, macroeconomics data, and 
quantitative and qualitative variables for the 37 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 




Development (OECD) countries. I followed the two main strands of literature regarding the 
econometric strategy: the linear regression methods on a linear transformation of the ratings 
and my specification through an ordered response framework where the rating scale 
determined the cut-off points. 
My main contribution to the existing literature is the main dataset employed and updating if 
the agency's rating continues using the same determinants as before. The number of countries 
utilized (37 countries), reaching four continents and operating data of the last 25 years, where 
happens several crises like the 1997 Asian Crisis, the 2008-09 economic and financial crisis 
or the European sovereign debt crisis having a large a dataset improving the quality of my 
models. In addition, the variables used, where I applied all kinds of variables, not only the 
usual economic and financial indicators but also qualitative variables. 
I find that several essential variables may have a steady impact on sovereign ratings. These 
are GDP per capita, Investment, General Public Debt, Unemployment, Government 
Revenue, and Governance. Of these variables, the most important are Unemployment and 
Governance, confirming that qualitative variables may be as important as the others type of 
variables. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the review of the 
ratings systems and literature. Chapter 3 describes the explanatory variables and the 
methodology used. Chapter 4 explains the data and illustrates the results. Finally, chapter 5 
will be the conclusions. 
 
  




2. RATING SYSTEMS AND LITERATURE 
 
2.1. REVIEW RATING SYSTEM 
I used sovereign credit ratings available by the two leading international rating agencies, 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P). Even though these agencies do not use identical 
qualitative codes, there is a connection between each agency rating level, as displayed in 
Table 1. S&P utilizes a similar qualitative letter rating in descending order from AAA to 
CCC-, while Moody's framework goes from Aaa to Caa3. 
Table 1 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A country's sovereign credit rating is vital to its financial system development and 
openness. The sovereign credit rating reflects the country's perceived willingness and 
capability to repay its sovereign debts. Thus, such credit ratings are often interpreted as a 
rating agency's view of the ex-ante risk of sovereign debt repudiation. 
Any decision determined by the rating agencies will influence sovereign bond yield. 
According to Afonso et al. (2012), there are significant responses of state bond yields spreads 
to changes in rating notations and outlook, particularly within the case of negative 
announcements (Kenourgios et al., 2020). Additionally, many responses of state yield to 
declarations that are not anticipated at 1-2 months scope, but there is bi-directional causality 
among ratings and spreads within 1-2 weeks. There are spillover effects, especially from 
lower-rated countries to higher-rated countries, and persistence impacts for recently 
downgraded countries. 
Sovereign ratings affect not only government bond yields but also change economic 
growth. Chen et al. (2016) examined a sample of Standard & Poor's sovereign rating changes 
for 103 countries over the 31-year 1982-2012. The growth rate of real per capita gross 
domestic product responds substantially to changes in sovereign rating revisions via the 
interest rate and capital flows channels. A narrower sovereign bond yield spreads and 
increased capital inflows are related to upgrades, which stimulate a re-rated country's 
economic performance, and therefore, the converse holds for downgrades. They saw that a 
one-notch upgrade (downgrade) causes a rise (decline) of about 0.6% (0.3%) in a re-rated 
country's five-year average annual growth rates. Besides economic growth, sovereign rating 




matters for Foreign Direct Investments. According to Cai et al.(2018), sovereign credit 
ratings of donor and recipient are essential drivers of bilateral FDI flows where mostly, FDI 
flow from low-rated donor countries to high-rated recipient countries 
As seen above, rating agencies influence should always expect the simplest rating 
quality and transparent methodology. Eijffinger (2012) determined that this is not the case 
as he saw the role of credit rating agencies during the 2010-11 EU sovereign debt crisis. The 
author concluded that rating agencies are lagging markets in their judgment. Their business 
model is imperfect as they face significant conflicts of interest and are very opaque in their 
methodologies. The lack of competition renders the large three rating agencies (Moody; 
Fitch; S&P) with too strong market position.  
As Eijffinger (2012) said that the rating agencies are opaque in their methodologies, 
several studies work out the determinants of the sovereign rating. However, there are several 
differences within the literature. One major division turns on the relative importance of 
political as against economic factors influencing credit ratings.  Some argue against the 
inclusion of political variables due to measurement problems. Others found that including 
political variables added explanatory power to their models. 
One of the first studies on sovereign studies was written by Cantor & Packer (1996). 
Their study explores the determinants and impact of the sovereign rating assigned by the 
two leading agencies, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor's, employing a sample of 49 countries 
at a specific point in time. They considered eight economic variables: income per capita, 
growth of GDP, inflation, fiscal balance, external debt balance, external debt, and the 
indicators for economic growth levels and default history to research the determinants of 
rating using the ordinary least square method. They found that the credit agencies have a 
similar weightage of variables in sovereign credit rating evaluation. 
  Afonso (2003) also conducted a paper to research the determinants of the sovereign 
credit rating of 81 countries assigned by the same two leading credit rating agencies. The 
author uses a linear and a logistic transformation of the rating scale. The variables that have 
statistically significant explanatory power for the rating levels are GDP per capita, the real 
rate of growth, inflation rate, external debt as a percentage of exports, the level of economic 
development, and default history. This paper was similar in explaining the determinants with 




Afonso et al.(2007) and Jošić & Mlinarić(2018), adding government debt, the government 
effectiveness indicators and unemployment, respectively.  
 Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) was one of the first researchers that concluded 
current economic and financial indicators alone do not determine ratings. In addition, the 
importance of economic variables is not the same across different rating categories. 
Economic variables do not carry the same significance for the highly rated countries with an 
extended financial stability history compared to the low-rated sample of nations with 
structural changes. Butler & Fauve (2006) were more precise in determining the qualitative 
determinants where they found that the quality of a nation's legal and political institutions, 
like the rule of law, political stability, the voice of the people, corruption control (Mellios & 
Paget-Blanc, 2006), government effectiveness or regulatory quality plays an essential role 
in determining these ratings, maybe more critical than macroeconomics effects such GDP. 
Additionally, Chee et al. (2015) discovered that economic freedom is crucial in deciding 
sovereign credit ratings. Finally, Afonso & Jalles (2019) revealed that even the person within 
the position of finance minister of a country has importance for sovereign rating. The 
existence of a more focused delegation-oriented fiscal framework, the Minister of Finance 
been a woman and a degree within the areas of finance or hard sciences looks to performance 
a more robust notation than a minister with a law background. 
Afonso et al. (2011) divided the determinants into two between short-run and long-
run of a variable on the sovereign rating level. The authors use linear and ordered response 
models, employing an ordered, probit and random effects called probit estimation for the 
period 1995-2005 from the three leading international rating agencies. Determinants that 
have a short-run impact on a country's credit rating are GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
government debt, and government balance meanwhile, government effectiveness, external 
debt, foreign reserves, and default history are long-run determinants.  
Not all agencies' ratings have an equivalent sovereign rating for a particular country. 
Afonso & Albuquerque (2017) worked the reasons behind that difference in sovereign credit 
rating. They used random effects ordered, and simple probit approaches for the period 1980-
2015. The authors concluded that structural balances and the existence of a default within 
the last tens of years were the least significant variables where the extent of net debt, GDP 
per capita, budget balances, and the existence of a default within the previous five years were 
observed to be the most relevant variables clarifying the rating divergences between 




agencies. They also found differences between speculative-grade ratings and good-
investment grades. For example, a default in the last two or five years decreases the rating 
difference between S&P and Fitch. There is a positive rating difference between S&P and 
Moody's for investment-grade rating, where a rise in external debt leads to a smaller rating 
gap between these two agencies. 
One of the questions that put more curiosity for researchers is whether the rating 
agency's methodologies were applied before and after the 1997 Asian Crisis or before and 
after the 2008-09 economic and financial crisis.  Afonso et al. (2007) estimate a panel linear 
regression model separately for the period 1996-2000 and 2001-2006, concluding that the 
majority estimated coefficients are similar across subperiods apart from the current account 
that was more important in 1996-2000 and then, a decline within the relevance after the 
Asian crisis while external reserves were possibly more important later. Some papers 
provided empirical evidence that the credit rating agencies changed their sovereign credit 
rating assessment after the start of the European debt crisis or the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
Reusens & Croux (2017) found that after the financial crisis, the importance of the financial 
balance, economic development, and external debt increased substantially, and the effect of 
eurozone membership switched from positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth gained 
much importance for highly indebted countries, and government debt became more 
important for countries with low GDP growth rates. Amstad & Packer (2015) also agrees 
that the debt to GDP ratio, the GDP growth rate, and the exchange rate regime's flexibility 
has become more critical in recent years. Lastly, Ewa (2020), being a euro area member, 
negatively affected countries' rating during the crisis, returning to positive in the post-crisis 
period but with a much weaker effect than before 2008. 
Finally, to estimate the best procedure to calculate the determinants of sovereign 
ratings under an ordered response framework, Afonso et al. (2009) concluded that the main 
efficient method is the random effects ordered probit estimation. They compared three 
procedures: ordered probit ordered logit and random effects ordered probit. The last one was 
the best because a substantial number of variables show up as significant that were not 
appeared using the opposite two methods, even predicting the rating, all were very similar. 
Still, the random effects ordered probit outperformed the other models. 
 






3.1. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
Building on the evidence provided by the current literature (Afonso et al., 2007; Cantor & 
Packer, 1996; Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006; Reusens & Croux, 2017), I selected a set of 
main macroeconomic and qualitative variables that might decide sovereign ratings. 
Current account– uncertain impact: a higher current account deficit could suggest an 
economy's inclination to consume beyond its means, undermining long-term sustainability. 
Alternatively, it could reflect a rapid accumulation of fixed investment, leading to higher 
growth and improved sustainability over the medium term. 
GDP per capita – a positive impact on rating: Economies that are more prosperous are 
expected to have more steady institutions to prevent government over-borrowing and be less 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. 
Investment (GFCF)- positive impact: higher investment could mean a higher business 
activity in the future, high trust in the economy, and finally, higher GDP growth in the 
present and the future. 
Budget balance – positive impact: large budget deficits absorb domestic savings and suggest 
macroeconomic disequilibria, negatively influencing the rating level. Continuous deficits 
may demonstrate problems with governance for policymakers. 
General Government debt – negative impact: a higher stock of General government debt 
implies a higher interest duty and should correspond to a higher risk of default. 
Unemployment – negative impact: a nation with lower unemployment tends to have more 
flexible labor markets, making it more prepared for changes in the economic environment. 
Additionally, lower unemployment reduces the fiscal duty of unemployment and social 
benefits while increasing labor taxation. 
Government Revenue- uncertain impact: a higher government revenue may indicate that the 
government collects enough revenue to provide goods and services to its citizens and 
companies and fulfill their redistributive role but also could indicate a higher tax burden for 




companies and citizens, decreasing their purchasing power and less capacity of raising taxes 
in times of crises. 
Government expenditure – uncertain impact: on the one hand, a smaller government could 
mean fewer taxes for companies and citizens, but lower services provided by the 
government, and the other hand, a big government might provide more goods and services 
but a lower capacity of increase it in times of crises. 
Inflation – uncertain impact: higher inflation will reduce the government debt in domestic 
currency, leaving more resources to cover the foreign debt. In addtion, it is symptomatic of 
problems at the macroeconomic policy level, mainly caused by deficits' monetary financing. 
Long-Term Interest Rate- negative impact: a sharper interest rate will mean higher interest 
payments, reducing the government's capability to fulfill its obligations. 
GDP growth – positive impact: higher real GDP growth strengthens the government's ability 
to repay outstanding obligations. 
World Bank Governance Indicators – positive impact: Six indicators like Control of 
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability. High quality of governance 
should positively affect the ability to service debt obligations. 
Eurozone- positive impact:  being part of the eurozone monetary union gives credibility and 
trust since there are rules of belonging (Stability and Growth Pact) and certainty of an 
independent monetary policy. 
Interest payments (% of expenditure)- negative impact: a higher share of interest payments 
in % of government expenditure could mean high-interest rates or high public debts that 
could be used in other productive areas, reducing the government's ability to invest where is 
needed. 
Default history – negative impact: previous sovereign defaults may imply a higher 
probability of getting default again.  
Reserves in Months of Imports – uncertain impact: higher foreign reserves should shield 
the government from defaulting on its foreign currency obligations. On the other hand, it 





could mean that the government has confidence that it would not default. Also, it could mean 
that we are in a high-open economy. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.2.1 LINEAR REGRESSION 
We will follow a similar approach developed by Afonso et al. (2011) regarding the 
determination of sovereign rating. We will start through the generalization of the cross-
section specification to panel data,  
Rit    X it   Zi  ai   it , (1) 
where we have: Rit – quantitative variable, achieved by a linear transformation; Xit is a vector 
including time-varying variables that include the time-varying explanatory variables 
described above and Zi is a vector of time-invariant variables. The index i (i=1,…, N) 
represents the country, the index t (t=1,…, T) signals the period and ai holds for the 
individual effects for each country i. Additionally, We assume that the disturbances μit are 
independent across countries and across time. We use three ways to estimate this equation: 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, or random effects estimation.  
 
3.2.2 ORDERED REGRESSION 
Under the same methodology as Afonso et al. (2011), We also estimate the determinants of 
sovereign debt ratings under a limited dependent variable framework. The ordered 
regressions is a natural approach for this problem because the rating is a discrete variable 
and reflects the order in terms of the probability of default. Each rating agency continuously 
evaluates a country’s creditworthiness, embodied in an unobserved latent variable  R*. The 
underlying variable gets a linear form and depends on the same set of variables as before, 
Rit    X it   Zi  ai   it , (1) 
We use three ways to estimate this equation: Ordered Probit, Ordered Logit, and Random 
Effects Ordered probit. Since there is a restricted number of rating categories, the rating 
agencies will have sixteen cut-off points that get each rating category's limits. The final 
rating will then be given by the following set of equations.  















I built a rating database with sovereign foreign currency rating, attributed by the two leading 
rating agencies, S&P and Moody's. I cover a period 1995- 2019, because this is the period 
that I have enough data to build models. The rating of a specific year is the rating attributed 
on the 31st of December. I group the ratings in 21 categories where the D observations are 
given the value one, while AAA observations receive the value 21.  
The countries selected were the 37 members of OECD (actually there are now 38 countries, 
Costa Rica joined this year): Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; 
Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Mexico; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Turkey; United Kingdom and United States. 
Current Account, Budget Balance, Government Debt, Government Revenue, Government 
Expenditure are a percentage of GDP. GDP per capita is in Dollars, and Investment is in 
millions of Dollars. Unemployment is in percentage of Active population. Inflation is 
determined by the consumer price index (CPI). Interest rate is in percentage of 10 years of 
interest of government debt. GDP growth is in percentage of GDP regarding the previous 
year. Governance is the average of the 6 World Bank indicators (Voice and Accountability; 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; 
Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption) stretching between -2.5 and 2.5. Interest payments 
are in percentage of Government Expenditure, and finally, Reserves are in number of months 
of imports that the national reserves can cover. Regarding the dummy variables like 
Eurozone, I anticipated two years of each adhesion to the single currency because the 
agencies will take into account. In addition, the default variable is regarding the last ten years 
that a country failed with its obligation. 








The final data set includes 37 countries with 16 variables making a total of 925 observations. 
One of the limitations in our analysis is to deal with an unbalanced panel data set due to 
problems with data availability. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables 




Before estimating the model, I estimate the correlation between the variables included in the 
model. This is a simple method to find multicollinearity because a high correlation (higher 
than 0,7) is a sign of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2013).  When this happens, it might 
produce several impacts on the estimation, such as affecting the regression model's 
predictive ability and the analysis of the regression coefficients and statistical significance 
tests. Other impacts might be the difficulty of understanding the real effects of each 
independent variable (Hair et al., 2013). One solution for this issue would be dropping those 
variables  (Wooldridge, 2012) and that was what I did. Initially,  I wanted more variables 
but because of high correlation (Table 5), variables like GDP forecast growth rate (Because 
of the variable "GDP growth") or the six individual variables of WB governance indicators, 
demanding I had to create a new variable that is an average between them ("Governance"). 
For the analysis, I do not report multicollinearity issues between the variables. The strongest 









4.2 LINEAL PANELS RESULTS 
 
4.2.1 RESULTS 
The results produced by the panel regressions point to broadly similar regression models 
across the two rating agencies (see Tables 6 and 7). Given the analytical facts above, the 
discussion will concentrate on the Pooled OLS estimations. This is supported by the fact that 
Hausmann (1978) tests reported at the end of each table point to reject random effects 
regarding fixed effects. Also, we can see that pooled OLS has a higher r-squared than fixed 
effects. More variables and all its variables have the expected sign. Meanwhile, fixed effects 
have some variables with the opposite sign like GDP per capita and Budget Balance for S&P 
and GDP per capita for Moody's. Nonetheless, I also report the fixed effects and random 
effects results for completeness and comparison purposes. 
(Tables 6 and 7) 
 
I describe the results of two models for each rating agency, the unrestricted and the restricted 
model. While the unrestricted model integrates all variables discussed above, the restricted 
model contains only the variables found to have a statistically significant impact, a process 
did by Afonso et al. (2007). Even though the sequence of excluding individual variables in 
moving from the unrestricted to the restricted regression can influence the final specification, 
the restricted models presented in the tables are robust to alternative exclusion procedures. 
As can be seen from the insights detailed toward the finish of each table, the explanatory 
power of the models is high with R-square values around 70 percent, and it remains nearly 
steady, moving from the unrestricted to the restricted versions. At the same time, the number 
of observations increases significantly. In addition, the variables found to be substantial in 
the unrestricted model mostly remain significant with the identical sign in the restricted 
edition. 
The restricted models show a similar set of explanatory variables across agencies. Moody 
only adds the Current Account and has a negative impact. A current account deficit indicates 
foreigners' willingness to cover current accounts through loans and foreign investment, 
which means that a negative account deficit is associated with high trust borrowers or good 
economic prospects. 




Eurozone dummy has no explanation for both agencies; meanwhile, if a nation has defaulted 
its debt on the past ten years, it will be penalized by at least six notches. 
For the real side, GDP per capita and investment are very significant for both agencies so 
much that for Moody's, Investment is the most important variable. 
Regarding the fiscal variables, for both agencies, government expenditure has a higher 
explanatory rating than government revenue, and the variables have a positive sign. If a one 
percentage point increase in the government expenditure raises both agencies by 0,1 notches, 
for government revenue just between 0,02 and 0,04, the agencies appreciated a more 
significant state. For government balance has similar value with government revenue, but it 
needs to be cautious of the dependence of other variables. Surprisingly, general government 
debt doesn't seem more important than the previous variables. An increase of 5 percentage 
points increases of debt decrease for both agencies 0,1 notches. Lastly, Governance is the 
most crucial variable for S&P and one of the most important for Moody's. An improvement 
of 1 point in this variable will increase 1,2 notches for the two agencies. 
Concluding, unemployment is one of the most critical variables, an increase of 5 percentage 
points will decrease both ratings one notch. Finally yet importantly, we have inflation, 
wherefore both agencies have a negative meaning that higher inflation for devaluating debts 
is not a great idea where an increase of 5 percentage points will put down by one notch on 
the rating. 
 
4.2.2 PREDICTION ANALYSIS 
My prediction analysis will concentrate on two elements: the prediction for the rating of 
each observation in the sample and the projection of movements in the ratings through time. 
Prediction with the pooled OLS model was made by rounding the fitted value to the closest 
integer between 1 and 21. 
 
Table 8 presents an overall summary of the prediction errors. 
 
(Table 8) 




The first conclusion is that the Pooled OLS is the method with the best fit, confirming what 
has been said above. On average, it correctly predicts 32 percent of all observations for the 
two agencies, 65 percent of the predicted ratings be within one notch, and 84 percent within 
two notches.  
Table 9 presents the total number of sample upgrades (downgrades), the expected number 
of upgrades (downgrades), the number of upgrades (downgrades) that were exactly predicted 




The Pooled OLS model correctly predicts 37% of downgrades and upgrades. In addition, it 
predicts more than 20% of the exact downgrades and upgrades. Here, we can notice that the 
model has lower efficiency rates compared with the others but a slightly higher efficiency 
regarding upgrades.  
The most visible difference among the table is not the number of correctly predicted changes 
but the total number of predicted changes. The models predict substantially more changes 
than the changes made by the agencies. For instance, for S&P, while it predicts around 58 
upgrades and 49 downgrades, while the Pooled OLS predicts 86 upgrades and 53 
downgrades. This strengthens the idea that rating agencies lag behind markets, along the 
lines discussed in Eijffinger (2012).  
 
  




4.3 ORDERED RESULTS 
 
4.3.1 RESULTS 
Ordered models should provide further perception into the determinants of sovereign ratings. 
As discussed, they create estimates of the threshold values between rating notches, letting 
an estimation of the shape of the rating curve. 
Like I did on the previous sub-chapter for linear estimation, for ordered also happens the 
same. Therefore, there are the results for each rating agency of a restricted and unrestricted 
model. While the unrestricted model integrates all variables discussed above, the restricted 
model contains only the variables found to have a statistically significant impact (Afonso et 
al., 2007). Even though the sequence of excluding individual variables in moving from the 
unrestricted to the restricted regression can affect the final specification, the restricted 
models presented in the tables are robust to alternative exclusion procedures. There is not an 
unrestricted model for random affected ordered probit because it was impossible to calculate 
it on STATA. So, to come up with the model presented, I had to figure each variable and 
then select those with high explanatory power. All variables could have a statistically 
substantial influence on each other. 
The results from the ordered estimations confirm the findings highlighted above. The core 
variables associated in the linear regressions also show up with the same sign. In addition, 
the ordered models suggest the significance of more explanatory variables, particularly for 
S&P. On the contrary of the linear models, on the ordered models, the variable current 
account does not appear to be significant; meanwhile, for the variable Reserves, for S&P 
seems on all three models with different signs between each other (positive for ordered probit 
and negative of the others two models). Making unclear which sign this variable should be 
like in chapter 3.1, where there was not an expected sign. Also, we can see that on these 
models, variables like Interest Payments or Long-Term interest Rate shows to be significant, 
where for Moody’s, an increase of Interest Payments a three percentage points leads to the 
rise of at least 0,5 notches. 
 
(Tables 10 and 11) 
 





Like I did in the previous sub-chapter, my prediction analysis will concentrate on two 
elements: the prediction for the rating of each observation in the sample and the projection 
of movements in the ratings through time. 
Unlike the linear models, here, for the ordered models, I will fit the predicted value and 
match it up to the cut-off points to determine the expected rating, as shown on the equation 
(1). 




The random effects ordered probit has the worse value between the three models, and I 
cannot conclude between ordered probit and ordered logit who is the method with the best 
fit because they have similar values. We can find out that for Moody’s, the models have a 
superior efficiency rate than for S&P, even we can check that for ordered probit and ordered 
logit, they achieve correctly 50% of rating, more than 70% within one notch and 86% within 
two notches. We can also conclude that the ordered models perform higher prediction values 
than the linear models for all models and both agencies. They correctly reach at least 40% 
of the rating, more than 60% within one notch, and 70% within two notches meanwhile, for 
the linear models, that does not happen. 
Table 13 presents the total number of sample upgrades (downgrades), the expected number 
of upgrades (downgrades), the number of upgrades (downgrades) that the several models 










The three models have very similar values of at least 45% of the downgrades correctly, and 
20% of the downgrades exactly predicted. The upgrades movements have slightly better 
values, with 25% of the upgrades exactly predicted. Even for Ordered Logit, it achieves for 
S&P more than half of the upgrades predicted. We can find out that the random effects 
ordered probit predicts more movements than the other two models. In addition, we can 
compare between the linear models and the ordered models and conclude that the linear 
models predict more movements than the ordered and deduce that the linear way might be 
better capturing the lag of the agencies Eijffinger (2012) than the ordered way. With that 
conclusion, like what had been said in the linear models, the ordered models predict 
substantially more changes than the changes made by the agencies. On average, the models 
predicted 65 downgrades meanwhile S&P and Moody’s downgraded 47 ratings. In addition, 










This dissertation's objective was to study the determinants of sovereign debt rating from 
Moody’s and S&P for the last 25 years (1995-2019) by the 37 countries of the OECD. 
Regarding the econometric approach, I used linear regression methods where I suppose that 
the pooled OLS is the best model to determine the rating. I also applied an ordered regression 
method where could not determine which model between Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit 
is allegedly the best model. 
I find that several essential variables may have a steady impact on sovereign ratings. These 
are GDP per capita, Investment, General Public Debt, Unemployment, Government 
Revenue, and Governance. Of these variables, the most important are Unemployment and 
Governance, confirming that qualitative variables may be as important as other variables.  
The models correctly predict almost 40% of the rating used, more than 60% within 1 notch 
and almost 80% within 2 notches. They also predict correctly almost half of the downgrades 
and more than one-third of the upgrades. I considered it satisfactory since agencies use more 
variables than I did and more qualitative variables. They also use, in some sense, forecast 
variables. 
The critical policy implication of this result is that if we can better understand the most 
important determinants that the rating agencies use to determine the rating of a country, we 
may also be to try to improve some indicators. 
The main difficulty in studying this topic was the lack of information. I expected the OECD 
countries, which are supposed to be the more developed countries, to have data for all the 
variables, but that has not been the case. Still, I gathered a large dataset.  
Further research can consider more countries, especially the developing countries. Maybe 
with more variables, qualitative and quantitative (if we are not in the presence of 
multicollinearity). Also, implement more forecast indicators in the model and create an 
average of the most important variables to eliminate short-run impacts. 
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Table 1– S&P and Moody's rating systems and linear transformations. 
  
Characterization of debt and issuer 




S&P Moody's Scale 21 Scale 
17 


















AA+ Aa1 20 16 
AA Aa2 19 15 
AA- Aa3 18 14 
 
Strong payment capacity 
A+ A1 17 13 
A A2 16 12 
A- A3 15 11 
 
Adequate payment capacity 
BBB+ Baa1 14 10 
BBB Baa2 13 9 



















Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty 
BB+ Ba1 11 7 
BB Ba2 10 6 
BB- Ba3 9 5 
 
High credit risk 
B+ B1 8 4 
B B2 7 3 
B- B3 6 2 
 
Very high credit risk 





CCC Caa2 4 
CCC- Caa3 3 
Near default with possibility 
of recovery 
CC Ca 2 
Default SD C 1 
D 
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Variable Definition Source Expected Sign 
Current Account Current account balance as percentage of 
GDP 
OECD +/- 
GDP per capita Nominal GDP per capita in US dollars OECD + 
Investment Gross capital formation as percentage of 
GDP 
OECD + 
Budget Balance Government balance as percentage of GDP OECD + 
General 
Debt GDP 
General Government Debt over GDP OECD - 
Unemployment Unemployment Rate OECD - 
Government 
Revenue 





General Government Expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
OECD +/- 
Inflation Average annual consumer price inflation rate OECD +/- 
Long term interest 
Rate 
10 years of government bonds OECD - 
GDP Growth Annual growth rate of real GDP OECD + 
Governance The mean of the 6 Worldwide Governance 





Euro Zone Dummy: 1 if be part of Euro zone ECB + 
Interest Payment 
expenses 
Interest payments as percentage of expense WB - 
Default last 10 
years 




months of imports 
Total reserves in moths of imports WB +/- 
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Current Account 809 -0.187 5.490 -22.614 16.458 
GDP per capita 925 51543.290 16232.760 5501.044 120670.500 
Investment 925 240966.100 512873.400 51.695 4454940 
Budget  868 -1.815 4.153 -32.065 18.632 
General Debt 793 70.821 41.086 6.649 238.726 
Unemployment 859 7.701 3.986 1.900 27.492 
Revenue GDP 860 41.443 7.538 19.869 59.208 
Spending GDP 726 43.828 7.572 20.996 65.103 
Inflation 922 3.690 7.519 -4.478 89.113 
Long term interest 
rate 
793 4.355 2.611 -0.489 22.498 
GDP Growth 923 2.793 3.087 -14.839 25.163 
Governance 777 1.058 0.724 -1.701 1.970 
Euro Zone 925 0.318 0.466 0.000 1.000 
Interest payments 811 6.738 4.666 0.145 39.293 
Default 10 years 925 0.00973 0.0982 0.000 1.000 
Reserves 887 3.341 3.074 0.00998 19.586 
DIOGO JANUÁRIO PIMENTEL                             DETERMINATS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RATING IN THE OECD 
 
 
Table 4 – Correlation Matrix of Variables.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) 1.000                
(2) 0.504 1.000               
(3) -0.129 0.1693 1.000              
(4) 0.541 0.328 -0.197 1.000             
(5) -0.0881 -0.0348 0.308 -0.382 1.000            
(6) -0.2622 -0.406 -0.139 -0.445 0.429 1.000           
(7) 0.302 0.0863 -0.209 0.0964 0.0867 -0.0747 1.000          
(8) 0.1803 -0.0381 -0.159 -0.177 0.394 0.223 0.307 1.000         
(9) -0.441 -0.284 -0.0244 -0.0412 -0.257 0.117 -0.236 -0.189 1.000        
(10) -0.319 -0.542 -0.0856 -0.290 0.0643 0.436 -0.142 0.0799 0.360 1.000       
(11) -0.138 -0.0200 -0.0346 0.248 -0.248 -0.184 -0.0832 -0.378 0.101 -0.251 1.000      
(12) 0.366 0.348 0.0743 0.274 -0.1190 -0.355 0.361 0.124 -0.136 -0.245 -0.0783 1.000     
(13) 0.124 0.219 -0.140 -0.114 0.356 0.214 0.304 0.333 -0.220 -0.195 -0.166 0.0569 1.000    
(14) -0.251 -0.315 0.367 -0.369 0.650 0.257 -0.0708 0.0979 0.0753 0.410 -0.0546 -0.179 -0.0061 1.000   
(15) -0.0799 -0.0932 -0.0525 -0.0880 0.403 0.561 0.0644 0.160 -0.135 0.373 -0.187 -0.160 0.148 0.109 1.000  
(16) 0.1775 -0.113 -0.134 0.151 -0.201 -0.110 -0.214 -0.246 -0.0102 0.0224 0.0204 0.155 -0.557 -0.0338 -0.0857 1.000 
(1) Current Account; (2) GDP per capita; (3) Investment; (4) Budget Balance; (5) General Debt; (6) Unemployment; (7) Revenue GDP; (8) Spending GDP; (9) Inflation; (10) Long Term Interest 
Rate; (11) GDP Growth; (12) Governance; (13) Euro Zone; (14) Interest Payment; (15) Default 10 years; (16) Reserves      
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) 1.000        
(2) 0.947 1.000       
(3) -0.111 -0.111 1.000      
(4) -0.118 -0.117 0.940 1.000     
(5) -0.0769 -0.0743 0.650 0.624 1.000    
(6) -0.0876 -0.0873 0.851 0.921 0.554 1.000   
(7) -0.141 -0.141 0.960 0.957 0.703 0.900 1.000  
(8) -0.148 -0.148 0.845 0.917 0.672 0.939 0.905 1.000 
(1) GDP Growth Forecast; (2) GDP Growth; (3) Control of Corruption; (4) Government Effectiveness; (5) Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; (6) Regulatory Quality; (7) Rule of Law; (8) Voice and Accountability. 
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Table 6 - Linear Estimation for S&P. 
 S&P 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





























































































































































































𝑅2 0.790 0.714 0.596 0.4373 0.655 0.4725 
Observations 435 540 435 582 435 566 











Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent.  




Table 7 - Linear Estimation for Moody’s. 
 Moody’s 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 

































































































































































































𝑅2 0.768 0.693 0.587 0.493 0.648 0.563 
Observations 436 510 436 509 436 498 











Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent.  
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Table 8 - Linear summary of prediction error. 
 
 

















Prediction Error (Notches) 
%Correctly 
Predicted 









P-OLS 541 52 38 59 182 100 73 37 34% 63% 84% 
Fixed Effects 583 84 30 53 180 70 66 100 31% 52% 68% 








P-OLS 510 56 35 56 154 125 54 30 30% 66% 83% 
Fixed Effects 509 66 34 54 158 54 67 76 31% 52% 72% 































 P-OLS 49 
53 7 (14%) 14 (29%) 58 86 15 (26%) 21 (36%) 
Fixed Effects 49 63 13 (27%) 22 (45%) 62 62 17 (27%) 19 (31%) 
Random 
Effects 49 








P-OLS 48 65 12 (25%) 22 (46%) 53 91 14 (26%) 20 (38%) 
Fixed Effects 43 68 10 (23%)   22 (51%) 53 59 12 (23%) 16 (31%) 
Random 
Effects 50 
77 15 (30%) 30 (60%) 50 60 8 (16%) 12 (24%) 
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Table 10 - Ordered Estimation for S&P. 
 S&P 
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit Random Effects 
Ordered Probit 
1 2 3 4 5 


































































































































































Continuation of Table 10.  
 S&P 
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit Random Effects 
Ordered Probit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cut 1 -11.139 -3.128 -33.438 -6.035 -11.861 
Cut 2 -10.845 -2.838 -32.670 -5.287 -10.947 
Cut 3  -9.726 -1.979 -30.553 -3.590 -10.677 
Cut 4  -9.266 -1.768 -29.700 -3.176 -9.941 
Cut 5 -5.428 -1.550 -17.024 -2.680 -9.775 
Cut 6 -0.743 -0.802 -1.445 -0.993 -8.383 
Cut 7  -0.268 -0.444 -0.534 -0.111 -7.461 
Cut 8  0.380 0.106 0.638 0.937 -6.537 
Cut 9 0.711 0.428 1.227 1.557 -5.942 
Cut 10 1.112 0.815 1.929 2.357 -5.187 
Cut 11 1.939 1.485 3.362 3.772 -4.171 
Cut 12 2.427 1.869 4.216 4.673 -3.248 
Cut 13 2.918 2.273 5.080 5.392 -2.419 
Cut 14 3.192 2.546 5.560 5.976 -1.599 
Cut 15 3.583 2.925 6.242 6.541 -0.490 
Cut 16  4.072 3.413 7.108 7.363 0.537 
𝑅2 0.327 0.267 0.327 0.303 - 
Observations 435 488 435 486 685 
















Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent.  




Table 11 - Ordered Estimation for Moody’s. 
 Moody’s 
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit Random Effects 
Ordered Probit 
1 2 3 4 5 




























































































































































Continuation of Table 11.  
 Moody’s 
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit Random Effects 
Ordered Probit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cut 1 -9.669 -1.802 -30.845 -4.446 -9.657 
Cut 2 -9.382 -1.550 -30.270 -3.919 -9.388 
Cut 3  -8.963 -1.229 -29.418 -3.223 -9.102 
Cut 4  -5.055 -0.720 -15.733 -1.888 -8.883 
Cut 5 -0.446 0.163 -1.019 0.130 -8.198 
Cut 6 -0.145 0.412 -0.490 0.591 -7.735 
Cut 7  1.310 1.770 2.189 3.094 -6.400 
Cut 8  1.891 2.325 3.299 4.145 -5.517 
Cut 9 2.298 2.706 4.058 4.847 -5.026 
Cut 10 2.644 3.031 4.686 5.425 -4.450 
Cut 11 2.929 3.335 5.189 5.961 -3.906 
Cut 12 3.638 4.055 6.452 7.245 -3.143 
Cut 13 4.441 4.781 7.871 8.514 -2.092 
Cut 14 4.744 5.039 8.409 8.964 -1.668 
Cut 15 5.102 5.337 9.050 9.490 -1.100 
Cut 16  5.488 5.720 9.740 10.165 -0.633 
𝑅2 0.370 0.351 0.372 0.352 - 
Observations 436 471 436 471 665 
Log likelihood -537.811 -582.851 -535.885 -581.728 -848.477 
 
 






Prediction Error (Notches) 
%Correctly 
Predicted 









Ordered Probit 489 43 48 69 211 64 22 32 43% 70% 85% 
Ordered Logit 487 40 41 80 202 74 21 29 41% 73% 86% 
RE Ordered 







 Ordered Probit 471 49 38 63 241 42 20 18 51% 73% 86% 
Ordered Logit 471 46 39 66 241 39 23 17 51% 73% 87% 
RE Ordered 
Probit  666 138 43 79 254 58 31 63 38% 59% 70% 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent.  
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 Probit 46 
52 10 (22%) 22 (48%) 51 81 13 (25%) 22 (43%) 
Ordered  
Logit 46 
51 9 (20%) 19 (41%) 51 98 16 (31%) 26 (51%) 
RE  
Ordered Probit 56 










48 8 (20%) 18 (45%) 46 64 11 (24%) 15 (33%) 
Ordered  
Logit 40 
48 10 (25%) 18 (45%) 46 64 11 (24%) 15 (33%) 
RE  
Ordered Probit 55 
97 10 (18%) 25 (45%) 77 76 16 (21%) 21 (27%) 
